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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, FINANCE, AND
THE LAW
Tom C.W. Lin*
Artificial intelligence is an existential component of modern finance. The
progress and promise realized and presented by artificial intelligence in
finance has been thus far remarkable. It has made finance cheaper, faster,
larger, more accessible, more profitable, and more efficient in many ways.
Yet for all the significant progress and promise made possible by financial
artificial intelligence, it also presents serious risks and limitations.
This Article offers a study of those risks and limitations—the ways
artificial intelligence and misunderstandings of it can harm and hinder law,
finance, and society. It provides a broad examination of inherent and
structural risks and limitations present in financial artificial intelligence,
explains the implications posed by such dangers, and offers some
recommendations for the road ahead. Specifically, it highlights the perils
and pitfalls of artificial codes, data bias, virtual threats, and systemic risks
relating to financial artificial intelligence. It also raises larger issues about
the implications of financial artificial intelligence on financial cybersecurity,
competition, and society in the near future. Ultimately, this Article aspires
to share an insightful perspective for thinking anew about the wide-ranging
effects at the intersection of artificial intelligence, finance, and the law with
the hopes of creating better financial artificial intelligence—one that is less
artificial, more intelligent, and ultimately more humane, and more human.
INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence is coming for our money.1 The rise of artificial
intelligence in finance and beyond has understandably garnered a great deal
* Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. Many thanks to Tom Baker,
Jonah Crane, Deborah Denno, and Robert Seamans for helpful comments and exchanges.
Additionally, I am grateful to Anjali Deshpande and Matthew Sherman for their extraordinary
research assistance. This Article was prepared for the Symposium entitled Rise of the
Machines: Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law, hosted by the
Fordham Law Review and the Neuroscience and Law Center on February 15, 2019, at
Fordham University School of Law. For an overview of the Symposium, see Deborah W.
Denno & Ryan Surujnath, Foreword: Rise of the Machines: Artificial Intelligence, Robotics,
and the Reprogramming of Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 381 (2019).
1. See generally ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FINANCIAL MARKETS (Christian L. Dunis
et al. eds., 2016).
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of attention in recent years.2 The progress and promise presented by artificial
intelligence and related new technologies in finance and elsewhere in the
economy has been remarkable, though much is yet to be realized.3 We are
just at the beginning of the beginning of the age of artificial intelligence. That
said, in just the last few decades alone, we have witnessed significant
advances in financial technology made possible in part by artificial
intelligence in various aspects of the financial sector.4 Previously, humandominated financial efforts and endeavors have been eliminated,
supplemented, or supplanted by artificial intelligence and smart machines.5
Trading, financial research, risk analysis, wealth management, investment
banking, and other areas of the financial sector have been dramatically
changed by the rise of artificial intelligence.6 Many of these advances and
innovations have been profit-enhancing and socially beneficial. They have
lowered the costs of capital for businesses and entrepreneurs, expanded the
types of financial resources to a broader and more diverse population of

2. This growing attention and interest in artificial intelligence has led to a growing
catalogue of books on the subject. See, e.g., AJAY AGRAWAL ET AL., PREDICTION MACHINES:
THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2018); PAUL R. DAUGHERTY & H.
JAMES WILSON, HUMAN + MACHINE: REIMAGINING WORK IN THE AGE OF AI (2018); AMIR
HUSAIN, THE SENTIENT MACHINE: THE COMING AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2017);
KAI-FU LEE, AI SUPERPOWERS: CHINA, SILICON VALLEY, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2018);
THOMAS W. MALONE, SUPERMINDS: THE SURPRISING POWER OF PEOPLE AND COMPUTERS
THINKING TOGETHER (2018).
3. See William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1169 (2018)
(“[T]he fintech revolution promises to produce great benefits for the wider economy, including
broader access to capital, fairer lending standards, better investment advice, and more secure
transactions.”). See generally Thomas H. Davenport & Rajeev Ronanki, Artificial Intelligence
for the Real World, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2018, at 108.
4. Douglas W. Arner et al., FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of Financial
Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 377–81 (2017).
5. See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 681–82 (2013)
(introducing the concept of cyborg finance).
6. See, e.g., Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated
Trading Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,573 app. 2 (Sept. 12, 2013) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. ch. 1) [hereinafter Concept Release] (“We have witnessed a fundamental shift in
markets from human-based trading to highly automated electronic trading.”); SCOTT
PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: HIGH-SPEED TRADERS, AI BANDITS, AND THE THREAT TO THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 322–23 (2012); Bradley Hope, How Computers Trawl a Sea of
Data for Stock Picks, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2015, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/how-computers-trawl-a-sea-of-data-for-stock-picks-1427941801 [https://perma.cc/
37XK-BZ3U]; Sheelah Kolhatkar & Sree Vidya Bhaktavatsalam, The Colossus of Wall Street,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2010, 5:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-1209/the-colossus-of-wall-street [https://perma.cc/5WTE-YHCB]; Andrew Ross Sorkin,
Fintech Firms Are Taking On the Big Banks, but Can They Win?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2016),
https:// www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/business/dealbook/fintech-firms-are-taking-on-thebig-banks-but-can-they-win.html [https://perma.cc/KR2V-ET7L]; Seth Stevenson, The Wolf
of Wall Tweet, SLATE (Apr. 20, 2015, 4:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/business/moneybox/2015/04/bot_makes_2_4_million_reading_twitter_meet_the_gu
y_it_cost_a_fortune.html?wpsrc=fol_tw. [https://perma.cc/8FCV-4AZ6]; John F. Wasik,
Sites to Manage Personal Wealth Gaining Ground, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/11/your-money/sites-to-manage-personal-wealthgaining-ground.html [https://perma.cc/3KLY-PUJG].
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investors, and made it easier for consumers to bank and invest.7 Yet, for all
the significant progress and promise presented by artificial intelligence in
finance, it also presents serious pitfalls and perils.
This Article is about those risks and limitations—the ways artificial
intelligence and misunderstandings of it can harm and hinder law, finance,
and society. It provides a broad examination of inherent and structural risks
and limitations present in financial artificial intelligence, explains the
implications posed by each identified danger, and offers some
recommendations for the road ahead. This Article does not seek to pinpoint
every peril posed by financial artificial intelligence, as such an attempt would
necessarily be incomplete and dated given the rapid changes in financial
technology and their evolving ramifications. Rather, this Article aims to
explore the larger penumbras of risks and limitations latent in financial
artificial intelligence and how we can better confront them. In pursuit of
these objectives, this Article hopes to provide another perspective for
thinking about artificial intelligence and its wide-ranging impact on law,
finance, and society.
Drawing on the author’s prior writings and building upon a rich and
growing body of interdisciplinary literature on artificial intelligence that
spans law, finance, technology, and sociology, this Article proceeds in two
major parts.8 Part I provides an overview of critical risks and limitations. It
describes four inherent areas of intertwined risks and limitations relating to
programming codes, data bias, virtual threats, and systemic risks. It explains
why and how each of these innate areas can harm and hinder the positive
potential of artificial intelligence in finance. Pivoting from the intrinsic to
the extrinsic, Part II contends with emerging ramifications and possible
responses. It explores the challenges posed by financial artificial
intelligence. Specifically, it focuses on implications relating to financial
7. See, e.g., Joel Hasbrouck & Gideon Saar, Low-Latency Trading, 16 J. FIN. MKTS. 646,
648 (2013) (suggesting that high-frequency, smart machine trading has positive marketstabilizing effects); Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48
U. RICH. L. REV. 523, 549–50 (2014) (discussing the benefits of high-frequency trading
powered by artificial intelligence); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson,
“Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337,
347 (2013) (“Today, liquidity is now much more possible outside of traditional exchanges. In
the new millennium, cheap information and low communication costs have expanded
markets.”). See generally Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461 (2015)
(cataloguing the diversity of investors in modern finance).
8. See, e.g., BRIAN CHRISTIAN, THE MOST HUMAN HUMAN: WHAT ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE TEACHES US ABOUT BEING ALIVE 5–10 (2011); CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF
MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 3
(2016); Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1050 (2014);
Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 522–23 (2018);
Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict?: Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1608–12 (2012); Tom C.W. Lin, The New
Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1287–93 (2017); Andrew W. Lo & Mark T.
Mueller, Warning: Physics Envy May Be Hazardous to Your Wealth!, 8 J. INV. MGMT., no. 2,
2010, at 13, 21; Gregory Scopino, Preparing Financial Regulation for the Second Machine
Age: The Need for Oversight of Digital Intermediaries in the Futures Market, 2015 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 439, 518–19.
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cybersecurity, competition, and societal impact in connection with the rise of
artificial intelligence in finance. Finally, the Article concludes by looking
forward to an incredibly promising future offered by financial artificial
intelligence, while cautioning of looming perils that may accompany that
incredible promise.
I. RISKS AND LIMITATIONS
Despite the incredible progress and promise made possible by advances in
financial artificial intelligence, it nevertheless presents some serious,
interconnected risks and limitations.9 Four categories of risks and limitations
relating to programming codes, data bias, virtual threats, and systemic risks
are particularly noteworthy. Individually and collectively, these four
perilous areas loom large as potential inherent and structural dangers in
connection with the rise of financial artificial intelligence.
A. Uncertain Markets and Artificial Codes
Artificial intelligence programs are limited by their underlying code and
their ability to fully and properly capture all that is happening in the
marketplace. There are simply too many complex, ineffable human and other
elements of financial markets and our uncertain world that cannot be fully or
properly captured by artificial lines of codes, no matter how comprehensive
or smart. As such, computer codes and models frequently make simplifying
and oversimplifying assumptions about the workings of the marketplace that
can make it appear that it is more predictive and productive than in reality.10
As a result of these simplifications, financial artificial intelligence tools have
the capacity to make powerful predictions and to produce incredible value
that helps move and grow markets, but on the other hand, they also operate
with potentially dangerous blind spots to the workings of the marketplace
because of their limitations.11
The fantastical powers and applications of financial artificial intelligence
have convinced many within the financial industry to naively believe that
these smart machines are the fix for most of our human-created financial
problems.12 While such admiration and acclamation is understandable, it

9. Bernhard Babel et al., Derisking Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence,
MCKINSEY ON RISK, June 2019, at 35, 36–37.
10. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SCHILLER, FINANCE AND THE GOOD SOCIETY 132–133 (2012)
(warning of the attractiveness of elegant financial models); David H. Bailey et al., PseudoMathematics and Financial Charlatanism: The Effects of Backtest Overfitting on Out-ofSample Performance, 61 NOTICES AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 458, 458–59 (2014).
11. See, e.g., AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 3–11; JAMES OWEN WEATHERALL, THE
PHYSICS OF WALL STREET: A BRIEF HISTORY OF PREDICTING THE UNPREDICTABLE 36–39
(2013); Lo, supra note 8, at 21; Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (Sept. 2, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economict.html [https://perma.cc/Z3YB-3G4H] (“[E]conomists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in
impressive-looking mathematics, for truth.”).
12. EMANUEL DERMAN, MODELS. BEHAVING. BADLY.: WHY CONFUSING ILLUSION WITH
REALITY CAN LEAD TO DISASTER, ON WALL STREET AND IN LIFE 143–87 (2011).
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must also be balanced with proper recognition of the limitations of artificial
intelligence at their underlying codes to perfectly depict and encapsulate the
complexities of the financial marketplace and the world at large.13 The 2008
financial crisis was caused and exacerbated in part by too many in the
financial industry placing too much faith in smart machines to properly
account for the risks and repercussions of a booming—then bursting—real
estate market.14 Uncertainty, risk, repercussions, and animal spirits in
finance can never be perfectly coded, modeled, mitigated, or eliminated
because human unpredictability is beyond precise mathematical modeling
and computer coding.15
Furthermore, deal negotiations, board presentations, regulatory actions,
legal interpretations, and many other activities critical to finance are done
largely among humans communicating using verbal and nonverbal language
in ways that smart machines are thus far unable to do on a consistent basis.16
Despite all of its amazing advances, artificial intelligence still does not
possess all of the capabilities of the human brain, with its trillions of synaptic
connections and billions of neurons.17 Artificial intelligence cannot fully
decipher a simple common human phrase like “it’s fine,” let alone the many
nonverbal expressions that humans use among one another.18
In sum, financial artificial intelligence is limited by the incapability of its
programming to fully capture the breadth, depth, and diversity of all that is
happening in a marketplace. This is due in large part to the whimsical,
flawed, and unpredictable role humans continue to play in finance and
markets.19 Therefore, as we grow more reliant and assured about the promise
13. Hu, supra note 8, at 1608–12.
14. See, e.g., ANTHONY SAUNDERS & LINDA ALLEN, CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT IN AND
OUT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISES: NEW APPROACHES TO VALUE AT RISK AND OTHER PARADIGMS
31 (2010); Amir E. Khandani & Andrew W. Lo, What Happened to the Quants in August
2007?, J. INV. MGMT., 2007, at 5, 5–9; Krugman, supra note 11 (“There was nothing in the
prevailing models suggesting the possibility of the kind of collapse that happened last year.”);
Joe Nocera, Risk Management, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 4, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/
2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html [https://perma.cc/A5VL-QFHE] (criticizing the flawed
computer risk models in connection with the 2008 financial crisis).
15. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 129 (2009) (“The law is not a
machine and the judges not machine-tenders. There never was and there never will be a body
of fixed and predetermined rules alike for all.”); FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND
PROFIT 347 (1921); Lo, supra note 8, at 14.
16. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN, supra note 8, at 5–10.
17. See ELLEN E. PASTORINO & SUSANN M. DOYLE-PORTILLO, WHAT IS PSYCHOLOGY?
355 (2012); see also Cade Metz, $1 Billion in Hand, A.I. Lab Wants to Mimic the Brain, N.Y.
TIMES (July 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/technology/open-aimicrosoft.html [https://perma.cc/9GCN-CVKD]; Cade Metz, DeepMind Can Now Beat Us at
Multiplayer Games, Too, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
05/30/science/deep-mind-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/6257-G3QD].
18. See HARRY T. REIS & SUSAN SPRECHER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS
249 (2009) (describing the importance of nonverbal communication in human interactions).
To be fair to the machines, many humans have difficulties deciphering the meaning of the
phrase, “it’s fine,” depending on the context.
19. See FRANK, supra note 15, at 129 (“The acts of human beings are not identical
mathematical entities; the individual cannot be eliminated as, in algebraic equations, equal
quantities on the two sides can be cancelled.”); WEATHERALL, supra note 11, at 36–39; Lo,
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of financial artificial intelligence, we should also grow more mindful of its
limited capacity to fully comprehend the ineffable complexities of a still
largely human-driven marketplace.
B. Discriminatory Data and Algorithmic Biases
Discriminatory data and algorithmic bias represent a set of critical risks
and limitations associated with financial artificial intelligence. They concern
the integrity and utilization of the underlying informational inputs that are
the fuel of artificial intelligence systems.20 Most artificial intelligence
systems initially need large quantities of data to teach the programs to
recognize certain patterns and make certain predictions. At its best, artificial
intelligence can uncover valuable new insights and observations from troves
of big data, otherwise impossible without artificial intelligence’s awesome
processing powers.21 At its worst, artificial intelligence can exacerbate
misguided old practices and aggravate past social harms with its incredible
processing powers and the veneer of novel objectivity since discriminatory
humans are associated with the decisions.22 While we should appreciate the
incredible potential of financial artificial intelligence, we should also be
cognizant of the potential risks inherent in systems built with data that may
reflect harmful past biases against the marginalized and the poor that we do
not want to replicate in the present or perpetuate in the future.23 We should
be particularly mindful of underlying data contexts and applications that are
being selected and coded by flawed humans with all of our biases, prejudices,
and fallacies.24
First, we should be mindful of the context of the data in order to properly
account for potential latent biases. When, where, why, and how was this
trove of data generated? Understanding the context of the data is critical to
understanding the data, its utility, and its potential risks. Inputting data
without properly understanding its context could lead to dangerous
discriminatory implications.25 As a crude example, if one obtusely inputs
supra note 8, at 21; Mark Whitehouse, Economists’ Grail: A Post-Crash Model, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 30, 2010, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230389
1804575576523458637864 [https://perma.cc/26HF-NTMZ] (reporting on the dangerous
limitations of financial models).
20. O’NEIL, supra note 8, at 3.
21. See Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66
UCLA L. REV. 54, 59 (2019) (“At first glance, because data collection has now become
ubiquitous, the benefits of algorithmic decisionmaking often seem to outweigh their costs.
And this is mostly right.”); see also PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE
QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD 1–3 (2015)
(discussing the benefits of algorithmic decision-making).
22. See O’NEIL, supra note 8, at 3.
23. VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE,
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 6–10 (2018).
24. See O’NEIL, supra note 8, at 3 (“The math-powered applications powering the data
economy were based on choices made by fallible human beings.”).
25. See Bornstein, supra note 8, at 522–23 (“If the underlying data on which an algorithm
relies is itself biased, incomplete, or discriminatory, the decisions it makes have the potential
to reproduce inequality on a massive scale.”).
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white-collar professional labor data from the 1940s to the 1970s into an
artificial intelligence system to predict what demographics of individuals
would be the most successful applicants for white-collar professions, the
suggestion would likely be white males of a certain age. This is not because
the algorithm or code is intentionally pernicious; rather, it is because the
underlying data is reflective and reproductive of certain harmful
discriminatory practices and (mis)understandings of a bygone era.26 As such,
if the context of the data is not properly accounted for, it can lead to
innovative technologies that perpetuate old, harmful ways—directly or
indirectly via proxy.27 Given the long history of discriminatory practices in
the financial industry, adopters of financial artificial intelligence must be
particularly mindful of the historical context of the data that they input into
their smart systems so as not to bring forth past biases into the present and
the future.28
Second, in addition to being more mindful of the context of the data, we
should also be more thoughtful about the application of the data by artificial
intelligence so as to mitigate potential algorithmic biases.29 Artificial
intelligence, as well as its underlying data and code at their most basic level,
is amoral, neither immoral nor virtuous. It lacks values and judgments. We
imbue these smart machines with the values and judgments that we believe
are important, however good or ill the intentions.30 Humans, with all of their
foibles and faults, design these systems.31 As such, society cannot simply
accept the outputs of artificially intelligent systems without due
consideration and understanding of their implications. For example,
financial artificial intelligence may recommend that veterans and certain
minority populations should be charged higher interest rates on loans without
ever considering the social and moral ramifications of such
recommendations. Because of the importance of finance in the lives and
livelihoods of people, it is critical that programmers, designers, architects,
and consumers of financial artificial intelligence systems properly account
26. SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES
REINFORCE RACISM 151–52 (2018).
27. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process
for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2014); Katyal, supra note 21, at 68–77.
See generally Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
857 (2017); Darcy Steeg Morris, Daniel Schwarcz & Joshua Teitelbaum, Do Credit-Based
Insurance Scores Proxy for Income in Predicting Auto Claim Risk?, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 397 (2017).
28. See generally MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE
RACIAL WEALTH GAP (2017); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).
29. See generally Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional
Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING
RES. 77 (2018).
30. See O’NEIL, supra note 8, at 3 (“[M]any of these models encoded human prejudice,
misunderstanding, and bias into the software systems that increasingly manage our lives.”).
31. See Katyal, supra note 21, at 59 (“While algorithmic decisionmaking may initially
seem more reliable because it appears free from the irrational biases of human judgment and
prejudice, algorithmic models are also the product of their fallible creators, who may miss
evidence of systemic bias or structural discrimination in data or may simply make mistakes.”).
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for the pernicious ways that such systems can be used and misused and must
include humans as safeguards in critical decision points.32
In sum, data and algorithmic bias represent one of the key categories of
risks and limitations inherent in the rise of financial artificial intelligence. As
the financial industry grows more reliant on artificial intelligence,
policymakers, regulators, and other key stakeholders must also grow more
vigilant about the potential harms that could arise out of data and algorithmic
bias. In recent years, there have been significant and serious movements to
combat algorithmic bias in finance and beyond.33 Ultimately, it is important
that new technology does not bring forth old discriminations into the present
and the future under the blended gloss of innovation, neutrality, and
objectivity.34
C. Virtual Threats and Cyber Conflicts
Another key category of risks and limitations associated with the rise of
financial artificial intelligence involves the rise of virtual threats and cyber
conflicts in the financial system. The emergence of financial artificial
intelligence is an extension of the growing reliance on technology in the
financial industry, and this burgeoning reliance has made the financial
industry ever more vulnerable to virtual threats. In 2019, IBM found that the
finance and insurance industry was the most attacked industry in terms of
cybersecurity threats.35 As the financial industry evolves even more into a
high-tech industry, it will surely face even more of the same types of cyber
challenges confronted by most traditional technology companies.36
The virtual threats against the financial industry can be both external and
internal. First, in terms of external virtual threats, financial firms and
financial industry regulators must be particularly vigilant against foreign
32. MICHAEL CHUI ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., NOTES FROM THE AI FRONTIER:
APPLYING AI FOR THE SOCIAL GOOD 41 (2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/
McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Artificial%20Intelligence/Applying%20artificial%20intelli
gence%20for%20social%20good/MGI-Applying-AI-for-social-good-Discussion-paper-Dec2018.ashx [https://perma.cc/KT3S-LXHT].
33. See, e.g., ALGORITHMIC JUST. LEAGUE, https://www.ajlunited.org [https://perma.cc/
W9XJ-LZT9] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
34. See Kim, supra note 27, at 877 (“Data models may also discriminate when neutral
factors act as ‘proxies’ for sensitive characteristics like race or sex. Those neutral factors may
be highly correlated with membership in a protected class, and also correlate with outcomes
of interest. In such a situation, those neutral factors may produce results that systematically
disadvantage protected groups, even though the model’s creators have no discriminatory
intent, and the sensitive characteristics have been removed from the data.”).
35. IBM, X-FORCE THREAT INTELLIGENCE INDEX 4 (2019), https://www.securindex.com/
downloads/8b9f94c46a70c60b229b04609c07acff.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MDS-4TJW].
36. See Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information
Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1042 (2007) (speculating about computer
viruses that target stock markets); see also Scott Patterson, CME Was the Victim of
‘Cyberintrusion’ in July, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cmesays-it-was-victim-of-8216cyber-intrusion8217-in-july-1384543426
[https://perma.cc/
3VSY-N7S7]; Michael Riley & Ashlee Vance, Cyber Weapons: The New Arms Race,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 21, 2011), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2011-07-20/cyber-weapons-the-new-arms-race [https://perma.cc/6677-VTMM].
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nation-states, competitors, terrorist organizations, cybercriminals, and
cybermercenaries.37 In the last decade alone, the financial industry has had
to confront a diverse matrix of external threats from state and nonstate actors,
some seeking profit while others seeking merely to sow chaos using
sophisticated hacks designed to steal billions of dollars, acquire valuable
information, and cause significant disruptions.38
Second, in addition to the external threats, financial firms and regulators
also have to guard against internal threats, such as rogue employees,
corporate spies, and misguided contractors.39 IBM in recent years has
37. See, e.g., MARK BOWDEN, WORM: THE FIRST DIGITAL WORLD WAR 48 (2011) (“Today
the most serious computer predators are funded by rich criminal syndicates and even nationstates, and their goals are far more ambitious.”); SHANE HARRIS, @WAR: THE RISE OF THE
MILITARY-INTERNET COMPLEX 103–22 (2014) (discussing the market for cybermercenaries);
INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC. ALL., CYBER INTELLIGENCE: SETTING THE LANDSCAPE FOR AN
EMERGING DISCIPLINE 7–9 (2011), https://www.insaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/04/INSA_CyberIntel_WP.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PG4-WHW2]; SCOTT PATTERSON,
THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF MATH WHIZZES CONQUERED WALL STREET AND NEARLY
DESTROYED IT 107–16 (2010) (discussing the theft of trade secrets from hedge funds); U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF., THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER STRATEGY 9 (2015),
https://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/final_2015_dod_
cyber_strategy_for_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9F8-PXNM] (“Criminal actors pose a
considerable threat in cyberspace, particularly to financial institutions, and ideological groups
often use hackers to further their political objectives.”); Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks
on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38
STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 232 (2002) (alluding to the difficulties of identifying a wide cast of
potential cyber attackers); Matthew Goldstein, Need Some Espionage Done?: Hackers Are
for Hire Online, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2015), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/15/needsome-espionage-done-hackers-are-for-hire-online [https://perma.cc/ST23-63N7]; Michael
Joseph Gross, Silent War, VANITY FAIR (June 6, 2013), https://www.vanityfair.com/
news/2013/07/new-cyberwar-victims-american-business
[https://perma.cc/86RN-L6V7];
Nicole Perlroth, Hunting for Syrian Hackers’ Chain of Command, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/18/technology/financial-times-site-is-hacked.html
[https://perma.cc/3D2U-852F] (reporting on the difficulties of tracing hackers); Nathaniel
Popper, Wall Street’s Exposure to Hacking Laid Bare, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 25,
2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/wall-streets-exposure-to-hacking-laid-bare
[https://perma.cc/UL9C-JJYB].
38. See, e.g., FIREEYE, APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE
OPERATIONS? 3–6 (2014), https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/
current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7BT-TCJB]; BARRY VENGERIK ET AL.,
FIREEYE, HACKING THE STREET?: FIN4 LIKELY PLAYING THE MARKET 3 (2014), https://
www.fireeye.com/current-threats/threat-intelligence-reports/rpt-fin4.html [https://perma.cc/
B5UV-WV33]; Megha Bahree, Former Bangladesh Bank Chief Blames Global System for
Theft,
N.Y. TIMES
(June
22,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/23/
business/dealbook/former-bangladesh-bank-chief-blames-others.html
[https://perma.cc/
C2N6-DBHZ]; Nicole Perlroth & Quentin Hardy, Bank Hacking Was the Work of Iranians,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/
technology/online-banking-attacks-were-work-of-iran-us-officials-say.html
[https://
perma.cc/GE4L-SBMH]; Michael Riley, How Russian Hackers Stole the Nasdaq,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 21, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2014-07-17/how-russian-hackers-stole-the-nasdaq [https://perma.cc/S6S9-SJ44]; Nelson D.
Schwartz, Facing Threat from WikiLeaks, Bank Plays Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/business/03wikileaks-bank.html
[https://perma.cc/
N3U6-9WLH].
39. See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 8, at 1050 (“[I]t is not technologically possible to
prevent those authorized to access data from misusing it . . . .”); Steven R. Chabinsky,
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estimated that human errors account for a very significant percentage of all
data and cybersecurity breaches.40 While such internal threats have always
existed within the financial industry, the industry’s heavy reliance on
technology like artificial intelligence has magnified the impact of such
internal threats. In a financial marketplace where millions of dollars can
automatically move in fractions of a second with or without a keystroke, the
rogue internal threat may be one of the most dangerous menaces to the
financial industry.41
Furthermore, both internal and external virtual threats have grown more
sophisticated and complex to detect and thwart.42 In the coming years, with
the rise of financial artificial intelligence, market regulators and participants
may have to confront unprecedented threats in the marketplace. Financial
deepfakes, financial fake news, and many other previously unimagined ways
to disrupt and manipulate the markets will persist and grow in a marketplace
that becomes ever more reliant on technologies like artificial intelligence.43
In 2016, then-Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen ominously testified before
Congress that cyberattacks on the financial system present “one of the most
significant risks our country faces.”44
In the last few years alone, hackers injected false data into the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR electronic filing system and
hacked social media accounts to manipulate the stock market.45 For instance,
in 2013, cybercriminals hacked the Associated Press’s Twitter account to
falsely report an attack on the White House, which momentarily caused a
$136 billion loss in market value when programs driven by artificial

Cybersecurity Strategy: A Primer for Policy Makers and Those on the Front Line, 4 J. NAT’L
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 27, 34–35 (2010); Robin Sidel, Banks Battle Staffers’ Vulnerability to
Hacks, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2015, 5:30 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-weakest-linkin-banks-fight-against-hackers-1450607401 [https://perma.cc/C9A5-KZ5B].
40. See IBM, supra note 35, at 7–8; IBM GLOB. TECH. SERVS., IBM SECURITY SERVICES
2014 CYBER SECURITY INTELLIGENCE INDEX 3 (2014), http://media.scmagazine.com/
documents/82/ibm_cyber_security_intelligenc_20450.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6EKB-6R8G]
(finding that 95 percent of data breaches are the result of human error).
41. Dune Lawrence, Companies Are Tracking Employees to Nab Traitors, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0312/companies-are-tracking-employees-to-nab-traitors [https://perma.cc/PQS8-LDQH].
42. See, e.g., Sealed Indictment, United States v. Murgio, 15 Cr. 769 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5,
2015), ECF No. 14; Sealed Indictment, United States v. Shalon, 15 Cr. 333 (S.D.N.Y. June 2,
2015), ECF No. 3; Bahree, supra note 38; Matthew Goldstein & Alexandra Stevenson, Nine
Charged in Insider Trading Case Tied to Hackers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/business/dealbook/insider-trading-sec-hacking-case.html
[https://perma.cc/9ZEQ-R9A6].
43. Lin, supra note 8, at 1287–94.
44. Chiara Albanese, Daniele Lepido & Giles Turner, “Anonymous” Joins Hacker Army
Targeting Central Banks for Cash, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2017, 4:33 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-17/-anonymous-joins-hacker-armytargeting-central-banks-for-cash [https://perma.cc/42PE-3XTN].
45. See, e.g., Amy Chozick & Nicole Perlroth, Twitter Speaks, Markets Listen and Fears
Rise, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/29/business/media/
social-medias-effects-on-markets-concern-regulators.html [https://perma.cc/L8RP-YMZP];
Goldstein, supra note 37.
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intelligence traded on the bogus news.46 Such innovative, pernicious threats
will continue to increase as finance becomes more reliant on automated
systems powered by artificial intelligence that may be particularly
susceptible to bad or false data as nation-states and nonstate actors try to
weaponize technological tools like artificial intelligence that have made so
much progress in the financial system possible against the system itself.47
In sum, as the financial industry becomes more like the technology
industry, with its greater adoption of artificial intelligence, it will face
growing and serious risks concerning virtual and other technology-oriented
threats.
D. Systemic Risks and Financial Accidents
The rise of financial artificial intelligence and related financial technology
heightens the dangers of systemic risk and major financial accidents.48 A
growing reliance on artificial intelligence and other forms of technology in
the financial industry can exacerbate intertwined systemic risks related to
size, speed, and interconnectivity. Moreover, the growing complexity of
technology increases the risks of serious financial accidents.
Wider adoption of financial artificial intelligence can amplify certain
systemic risks for the financial system relating to size, speed, and linkage.
First, in terms of size, there exists the well-known systemic risk of “too big
to fail,” whereby large financial institutions supposedly become too large and
important to the welfare of the system to falter or fail.49 As financial artificial
intelligence gains more ground in the financial industry, institutions that are
critical to the system because of their large data holdings for the purpose of
financial artificial intelligence could also become too important to the system
to fail. As such, in the future, the systemic risk of size may mean not only
the size of a financial institution’s balance sheet but also the size of its
databases.
Second, in terms of speed, wider adoption of financial artificial
intelligence would likely lead to even faster financial speeds, which would
create a systemic risk of “too fast to save,” whereby disruptions, bad acts,
and other events could destabilize the financial system before any corrective

46. Chozick & Perlroth, supra note 45.
47. See LEE, supra note 2, at 82–86 (discussing the competition between the United States
and China in the area of artificial intelligence); BRAD SMITH & CAROLE ANN BROWNE, TOOLS
AND WEAPONS: THE PROMISE AND THE PERIL OF THE DIGITAL AGE 69–76 (2019).
48. See Magnuson, supra note 3, at 1199 (arguing that new financial technologies can
create and complicate systemic risks).
49. See S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. &
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A
FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, S. HRG. 112-675, at 19–22 (1st Sess. 2011) (studying the regulatory
challenges of “too big to fail”); ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY
OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM
CRISIS—AND THEMSELVES 538–39 (2009) (discussing the systemic risk associated with “too
big to fail” institutions).

542

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

or preventive measure could be taken.50 During times and trading periods of
distress, panic, and confusion, high-speed automated programs running on
artificial intelligence can sow greater volatility and calamity by rapidly
increasing or decreasing liquidity.51 In the last few decades alone, we have
seen unprecedented volatility and flash crashes in the financial markets,
made possible by new technology like artificial intelligence.52
Third, in terms of linkage, the prevalence of financial artificial intelligence
could intensify the systemic risk of “too linked to fail,” whereby actions,
errors, and failings trigger destabilizing ripples across the financial system
because of the interconnectivity of firms, regardless of their value or size.53
This systemic risk is particularly troubling because of the highly
intermediated and interconnected nature of modern finance and the use of
similar and interdependent artificial intelligence programs by many firms
within the financial industry.54 As a consequence of these tight links and
interoperative programs, one or a few firms can create dangerous cycles and
cascades of volatility and spillover effects that destabilize the entire financial
system.55
50. See Andrei A. Kirilenko & Andrew W. Lo, Moore’s Law Versus Murphy’s Law:
Algorithmic Trading and Its Discontents, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2013, at 51, 60; Lin, supra
note 5, at 711–14 (“[A]utomated trading systems provide enormous economies of scale and
scope in managing large portfolios, but trading errors can now accumulate losses at the speed
of light before they’re discovered and corrected by human oversight.”).
51. FRANK PARTNOY, WAIT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DELAY 43 (2012).
52. See, e.g., CFTC & SEC, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010,
at 1 (2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/34T5-VF5T]; Timothy Lavin, Monsters in the Market, ATLANTIC (July/Aug. 2010),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/07/monsters-in-the-market/308122
[https://perma.cc/EL84-ALZD]. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY ET AL., JOINT STAFF
REPORT:
THE U.S. TREASURY MARKET ON OCTOBER 15, 2014 (2015), http://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Joint_Staff_Report_Treasury_1015-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ5Q-PQWE].
53. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 5, at 714–16 (introducing the concept of “too linked to fail”);
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 200 (2008) (discussing the systemic
risks associated with financial intermediation).
54. See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–
2008, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2009, at 77, 96–97 (describing the financial system’s
“interwoven network of financial obligations”); Tom C.W. Lin, Infinite Financial
Intermediation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 661 (2015) (explicating on the highly
intermediated nature of modern finance). See generally HAL S. SCOTT, COMM. ON CAPITAL
MKTS. REGULATION, INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION (2012), http://
www.capmktsreg.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/2012.11.20_Interconnectedness_
and_Contagion.pdf [https://perma.cc/45V4-MGZL].
55. See BRIAN R. BROWN, CHASING THE SAME SIGNALS: HOW BLACK-BOX TRADING
INFLUENCES STOCK MARKETS FROM WALL STREET TO SHANGHAI 7 (2010); PATTERSON, supra
note 6, at 9–10 (discussing the financial dangers of “a vicious self-reinforcing feedback loop”);
Louise Story & Graham Bowley, Market Swings Are Becoming New Standard, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 11, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/12/business/economy/stock-marketssharp-swings-grow-more-frequent.html [https://perma.cc/MVN8-ZC6U]; James Surowiecki,
New Ways to Crash the Market, NEW YORKER (May 11, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/18/new-ways-to-crash-the-market
[https://perma.cc/S4SS-FKJM] (“High-speed firms tend to mimic one another’s trading
strategies, and in times of crisis this can amplify price swings.”). See generally Chris
Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235 (2019).
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In addition to the rise of financial artificial intelligence that exacerbates
systemic risk, its ascent could also lead to financial accidents. Charles
Perrow, in his landmark study on technological risks Normal Accidents:
Living with High-Risk Technologies, theorized that complex technology
systems, like the artificial intelligence–driven ones that are at the heart of our
financial system, are inherently vulnerable to breakdowns and accidents.56
As financial artificial intelligence grows more prevalent, “normal financial
accidents” will likely also grow more frequent within the financial system.57
In fact, both the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq, the two most
prominent American stock exchanges, suffered serious malfunctions that
halted hundreds of billions of dollars worth of trading for hours during
otherwise normal trading sessions in recent years.58
In sum, the proliferation of artificial intelligence in finance increases the
dangers of systemic risks and major financial accidents. While we should
appreciate the many new positive outgrowths of financial artificial
intelligence for certain firms and institutions, we should also be mindful of
the hazards and challenges that it may cause for the entire financial system
going forward.59
II. KEY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The proliferation of financial artificial intelligence will have many
profound implications on finance, law, and society. While the specific and
wider effects of financial artificial intelligence remain forthcoming, three
particular areas are worthy of closer near-term consideration and action:
financial cybersecurity, competition, and societal impact.
A. On Financial Cybersecurity
One of the most significant issues and challenges arising from the wider
adoption of financial artificial intelligence is financial cybersecurity. Today,
many of the more sophisticated attempts to manipulate and disrupt financial
56. See CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES
4–5 (1999).
57. Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley, Regulating or Redesigning Finance?: Market
Architectures, Normal Accidents, and Dilemmas of Regulatory Reform, in MARKETS ON
TRIAL: THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 279, 284–89 (Michael Lounsbury
& Paul M. Hirsch eds., 2010).
58. See E. S. Browning & Scott Patterson, Market Size + Complex Systems = More
Glitches, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 2013, 10:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887323980604579029342001534148
[https://perma.cc/5W6H-Y4Z7];
Nathaniel Popper, Pricing Problem Suspends Nasdaq for Three Hours, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Aug. 22, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/nasdaq-market-haltstrading [https:// perma.cc/9U9Q-KW3Z]; Nathaniel Popper, The Stock Market Bell Rings,
Computers Fail, Wall Street Cringes, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/business/dealbook/new-york-stock-exchange-suspendstrading.html [https://perma.cc/76TB-XCTN].
59. See, e.g., Korsmo, supra note 7, at 549–50 (listing the benefits relating to algorithmic
trading); Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 7, at 347 (discussing how new financial
technologies have increased liquidity and lowered transactional costs for many in the
marketplace).
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markets take place exclusively in cyberspace and are aimed at artificial
intelligence systems.60 Because financial artificial intelligence relies on
interconnected, complex technological systems, being able to safeguard
those systems from threats and attacks is critical to preserving the integrity
of the financial system.61
One of the critical challenges concerning financial cybersecurity is that
disparate private parties, who may have misaligned and competing interests,
control much of the global cyberinfrastructure.62 As such, private firms
motivated by higher profits, competitive advantage, expense reductions, and
other understandable considerations may not always act with systemic
financial cybersecurity as a top priority in their decision-making.63 For
instance, many financial firms already spend substantial sums of money
annually on regulatory compliance and cybersecurity efforts and may be
reluctant to spend more on a timely basis going forward.64 That said, sound
systemic financial cybersecurity requires all or most firms to have strong
cybersecurity capabilities. It is not nearly enough for just a few firms to have
strong cybersecurity safeguards while their counterparties and vendors are
vulnerable, given the interconnected nature of the modern financial system.
As such, public policymakers need to think creatively to incentivize private
firms around the world to innovate faster and cooperate better with other
firms and public regulators as the specter of cybersecurity attacks grows
larger with advances in financial artificial intelligence.65

60. Lin, supra note 8, at 1287–93.
61. See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 6, at 8–10; Tom C.W. Lin, Financial Weapons of
War, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1377, 1405–08 (2016) (discussing the threats of “cyber financial
weapons”).
62. See Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L.J. 317, 350–51
(2015) (“[P]rivate parties own the majority of the underlying infrastructure that supports the
cyber domain.”).
63. See, e.g., STEWART BAKER ET AL., MCAFEE, IN THE CROSSFIRE: CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AGE OF CYBER WAR 14 (2010), https://www.govexec.com/
pdfs/012810j1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BP3N-Q8LL]; N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., REPORT
ON CYBER SECURITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR 11 (2014), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/
docs/reportpub/cyber/dfs_cyber_banking_report_052014.pdf [https://perma.cc/74SR-YL58]
(reporting on resource constraints and stale software as persistent financial cybersecurity
challenges); Bambauer, supra note 8, at 1036 (“Rational vendors will accordingly skimp on
security investments, at least at the margins, since they will likely not be able to recover those
costs via higher prices that correlate with higher quality.”).
64. Tom C.W. Lin, Compliance, Technology, and Modern Finance, 11 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 159, 164–68, 177–78 (2016).
65. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 37, at xxii (“Defending computer networks, and
launching attacks on them, requires the participation, willing or otherwise, of the private
sector.”); Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503,
1550–52 (2013) (discussing the use of both incentives and punishments to improve
cybersecurity); Bruce P. Smith, Hacking, Poaching, and Counterattacking: Digital
Counterstrikes and the Contours of Self-Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 171, 173 (2005);
Christopher S. Yoo, Cyber Espionage or Cyberwar?: International Law, Domestic Law, and
Self-Protective Measures, in CYBERWAR: LAW & ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS 175, 192–
93 (Jens David Ohlin, Kevin Govern & Claire Finkelstein eds., 2015) (discussing the need for
“improved software engineering”).
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Ultimately, sound and sustainable financial cybersecurity requires smart
leadership and partnership from both the public and private sectors.66 As
then-President Barack Obama remarked in 2015 about cybersecurity,
“neither government, nor the private sector can defend the nation alone. It’s
going to have to be a shared mission—government and industry working
hand in hand, as partners.”67 In the absence of such coordinated action, the
integrity of the financial system could come into question as institutions and
investors lose trust and faith in the stability and reliability of the financial
system.68 This is particularly true with the rise of financial artificial
intelligence because of its heavy reliance on electronic networks and
computerized systems for its operations. Furthermore, many financial
artificial intelligence systems are “black box” systems, meaning that their
operations are difficult or impossible to fully understand, explain, or audit.69
In sum, wider adoption of financial artificial intelligence will have serious
ramifications on the cybersecurity and integrity of the global financial
marketplace. Private and public institutions throughout the world must act
with greater speed and coordination to guard against the looming threats of
cyberattacks, manipulation, and other bad acts that strike at the heart of the
modern, high-tech financial system.70 It should be noted that while such
urgency may be clear and present, it does not necessarily mean that such
urgency would manifest in swift and smart policies and actions given various
geopolitical complexities involved in a vexing issue like financial
cybersecurity.71
B. On Competition
The rise of financial artificial intelligence will have significant
implications for competition within the financial industry and the greater
economy. Because artificial intelligence is highly dependent on large data
sets for insights, firms with captive, large sets of data built into their structural
platforms may end up having a durable competitive advantage in the
marketplace that ultimately hurts consumer welfare and the competitive
landscape of finance.72 The ongoing debates and investigations concerning
66. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 467, 469–72
(2017).
67. Press Release, Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President at the
National Cybersecurity Communications Integration Center (Jan. 13, 2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/13/remarks-presidentnational-cybersecurity-communications-integration-cent [https://perma.cc/XMR5-N2MB].
68. See BAKER ET AL., supra note 63, at 14; Scopino, supra note 8, at 518–19 (arguing for
greater regulatory attention on “digital intermediaries” in finance).
69. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 4–6 (2015); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The
Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1089–96 (2018).
70. See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 8, at 1062–63; Scopino, supra note 8, at 518–19.
71. See Eichensehr, supra note 66, at 507–11 (identifying various challenges arising from
public-private actions on cybersecurity).
72. See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 784–88
(2017) (discussing how online platforms “may facilitate anticompetitive conduct and
structures”).
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competition and antitrust among large technology companies like Google,
Amazon, and Facebook may soon spill over into the financial industry with
large financial institutions, which are functionally large technology
companies similarly powered by large troves of data.73 In recent years, large
financial institutions like JPMorgan Chase have reportedly hired more
software developers and technologists than Google or Microsoft.74
Technological innovations and advances have been dramatically changing
the financial industry.75 The ascent of financial artificial intelligence is an
important extension of this ongoing sea change. New financial technology
and artificial intelligence have transformed many segments of modern
finance. In trading, smart machines powered by artificial intelligence now
trade most securities in global finance, often doing so better, cheaper, and
faster than their human counterparts.76 In risk management, many, if not
most, large financial institutions use financial artificial intelligence programs
to aid them in managing risk.77 BlackRock, the world’s largest asset
management company, with trillions of dollars under management, uses
Aladdin, a proprietary artificial intelligence program to manage risk for its
clients. Most significant financial institutions use artificial intelligence

73. See, e.g., Cecilia Kang et al., Tech Titans Face Tough Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (June 3,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/03/technology/facebook-ftc-antitrust.html [https://
perma.cc/D3XM-9848]; Jack Nicas et al., How Each Big Tech Company May Be Targeted by
Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/08/technology/
antitrust-amazon-apple-facebook-google.html [https://perma.cc/PA37-VG8D].
74. CA TECHS., HOW TO SURVIVE AND THRIVE IN THE APPLICATION ECONOMY 2 (2014),
https://www.ca.com/content/dam/ca/us/files/product-brief/how-to-survive-and-thrive-in-theapplication-economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VNH-T22T].
75. See, e.g., DAVID J. LEINWEBER, NERDS ON WALL STREET: MATH, MACHINES, AND
WIRED MARKETS 31–63 (2009) (charting the growth of electronic financial markets); Jonathan
R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an Evolving
World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563, 563 (2005) (“Advances in technology, combined with the
dramatic decrease in the cost of information processing, have conspired to change the way
that securities transactions occur.”); Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate:
Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 430 (2011) (highlighting
how finance has changed due in large part to “fast-changing technology”); Scopino, supra
note 8, at 445–52 (explaining the impact of new financial technology on financial markets);
Felix Salmon & Jon Stokes, Algorithms Take Control of Wall Street, WIRED (Dec. 27, 2010,
12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2010/12/ff-ai-flashtrading [https://perma.cc/98CPUEY2] (“It’s the machines’ market now; we just trade in it.”).
76. See Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital
Markets, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1618 (2015) (“The growth of algorithmic trading over the
years can be explained by the significant utilities it offers for almost all parts of the trading
process.”); Nathaniel Popper, Public Exchanges Duel with Newcomers over Trade
Transparency, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/business/
stock-exchanges-duel-with-newcomers-over-trade-transparency.html
[https://perma.cc/
KL9K-BT2W]; Nelson D. Schwartz & Louise Story, Surge of Computer Selling After
Apparent Glitch Sends Stocks Plunging, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/business/economy/07trade.html
[https://perma.cc/
8WWJ-PBU4].
77. See Kolhatkar & Bhaktavatsalam, supra note 6; The Rise of BlackRock, ECONOMIST
(Dec. 7, 2013), https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21591174-25-years-blackrock-hasbecome-worlds-biggest-investor-its-dominance-problem [https://perma.cc/WVZ3-TY9F].
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programs in their financial research efforts as well.78 For instance, such
programs can be coded to analyze market trends, read breaking news, and
spot investment opportunities entirely on their own.79 Finally, in wealth
management, artificial intelligence programs can manage funds just as well
as many financial advisors—at a fraction of the cost. New financial
technology companies, like Wealthfront and Betterment, use artificial
intelligence programs to advise and manage billions of dollars of assets for
clients at lower costs with comparable returns, all from an app on one’s
phone.80
While all of the aforementioned innovations and advances made possible
by artificial intelligence have created many benefits, they also raise
legitimate concerns about competition in ways historically unconsidered or
underappreciated by banking and antitrust regulators.81 Because the
technology and data underlying much of financial artificial intelligence
requires significant investments and favors the data-rich, there is appropriate
concern that early movers and better-resourced institutions would acquire
durable competitive advantages that ultimately stifle innovation, eliminate
meaningful competition, and harm consumer welfare.82 It is not difficult to
foresee a financial firm acquiring and leveraging its superior data in terms of
quality and quantity, as well as concentrated network effects, to build an
economic moat to shield itself from competition in the same manner as its
more traditional technology-oriented counterparts.83 Similar to current
concerns relating to the domination of Google, Amazon, and Facebook in
their respective technological territories in search, online commerce, and
social media, there is good reason to believe that some large, dominant
financial institutions may warrant similar scrutiny with the rise of financial
artificial intelligence in the coming years.84 Whereas federal and state
regulars are currently focused on large, traditional technology companies for
their anticompetitive practices and implications, in the near future such
regulators may turn a similar investigatory gaze on financial institutions
given the rise of financial artificial intelligence and its implications for
competition within the financial industry.85
78. See, e.g., Hope, supra note 6.
79. See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 6, at 322–23; Stevenson, supra note 6.
80. Wasik, supra note 6.
81. Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA
L. REV. 232, 261–64 (2018).
82. Khan, supra note 72, at 784–88.
83. See, e.g., OECD, DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION: BIG DATA FOR GROWTH AND WELLBEING 1, 7 (2015) (discussing the data as key ingredient to economic and business growth in
the modern economy); Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 309, 334–35 (2017) (“Digital markets suffer from a high level of concentration.
Currently a handful of digital intermediaries with mega platforms control effective points of
access to potential users.”).
84. See, e.g., TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 122–26 (2018) (highlighting the
anticompetitive implications of giant technology companies).
85. See Steve Lohr, New Google and Facebook Show Big Tech Scrutiny Is Rare
Bipartisan Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/06/
technology/attorney-generals-tech-antitrust-investigation.html
[https://perma.cc/NPG5-
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Therefore, as artificial intelligence becomes more common in finance,
policymakers must grow more watchful, thoughtful, and action-oriented
about the potential implications it may have for competition within the
industry and beyond.86
C. On Societal Impact
The rise of financial artificial intelligence will likely have a profound
societal and economic impact on an individual as well as a collective basis.87
On an individual basis, the rise of artificial intelligence in finance raises
important questions about the role of humans in finance. On a collective
basis, the ascent of financial artificial intelligence also raises important
questions about the role and purpose of finance in society.
First, on an individual basis, financial artificial intelligence has profound
implications for people working in finance, just as similar ramifications are
unfolding in other sectors of our economy.88 Artificial intelligence has
gradually—then rapidly—displaced much human labor and effort in finance,
and understandably so.89 Smart machines driven by artificial intelligence
with perfect memory and recall can process large volumes of data faster,
cheaper, and more accurately than humans in most circumstances, and they
do not tire with more work or grow irrational with “animal spirits” the way
humans normally do.90 It is worth noting that while artificial intelligence has
reduced and eliminated many jobs in finance and beyond, it has also
produced new jobs, some of which are highly desirable and others that are

MT67] (reporting on federal and state investigations into the anticompetitive practices of large
technology companies).
86. See Kahn, supra note 72, at 797–800 (arguing for more antitrust action against online
platforms).
87. See generally THE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: AN AGENDA (Ajay
Agrawal et al. eds., 2019).
88. See JAMES BARRAT, OUR FINAL INVENTION: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE END
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THREAT OF A JOBLESS FUTURE 83–87 (2015); JOHN MARKOFF, MACHINES OF LOVING GRACE:
THE QUEST FOR COMMON GROUND BETWEEN HUMANS AND ROBOTS 327 (2015).
89. See, e.g., Concept Release, supra note 6, at 56,573 app. 2 (“We have witnessed a
fundamental shift in markets from human-based trading to highly automated electronic
trading.”); ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK,
PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 57–71 (2014); FORD,
supra note 88, at 6–28 (examining the rise of robotics and automation across multiple
industries within the economy); SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE
FROM TECHNOLOGY AND LESS FROM EACH OTHER 279–81 (2011); Lin, supra note 5, at 682
(discussing the rise of smart financial machines); Daron Acemoglu & Pascual Restrepo,
Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and Work (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 24196, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24196 [https://perma.cc/K48V22KA].
90. See NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 11 (2014);
David Silver et al., Mastering the Game of Go with Deep Neural Networks and Tree Search,
529 NATURE 484, 484 (2016). See generally GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER,
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less so.91 Despite the undeniable and impressive rise of financial artificial
intelligence, humans will likely remain the critical players in modern finance
(for now) because of their judgment and sophistication, especially as it relates
to other humans.92 More importantly, human engagement that touches on
emotions, ethics, values, empathy, culture, and other basic human traits
remains critical to the success and failure of any financial endeavor. Smart
machines, although artificially intelligent, still need humans to build their
initial codes and hardware as well as embed them with human values and
ethics.93 Moreover, humans can nevertheless override their smart machines
in many situations. As such, in many circumstances, artificial intelligence is
often outmatched by natural stupidity or natural brilliance. Ultimately, on an
individual basis, financial artificial intelligence will become an even more
critical technological ally for humans in finance and not their adversary. This
will be the case for both government financial regulators and those they
regulate.94 The important questions in the face of these rapid technological
changes in finance and beyond are less about what artificial intelligence is
going to do to humans; rather, they are more about what humans are going to
do with artificial intelligence going forward to make one another even better
and more powerful.95
Second, on a collective basis, financial artificial intelligence implicates
significant questions about the proper role of finance in society. As finance
continues to adopt new technologies like artificial intelligence, it can
sometimes lose sight of the fact that finance at its core—behind and beyond
all the high-tech gadgetries, complex codes, and seas of data—is driven by
real people and real social purposes.96 Faster, cheaper, bigger, and more
efficient finance does not necessarily mean a more just and socially valuable
form of finance.97 Frequently in discussing matters of finance, scholars,
regulators, and policymakers forget that people and communities are at the
91. See MARY L. GRAY, GHOST WORK: HOW TO STOP SILICON VALLEY FROM BUILDING A
NEW GLOBAL UNDERCLASS, at x–xvii (2019); H. James Wilson et al., The Jobs That Artificial
Intelligence Will Create, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Summer 2017, at 14, 14–16.
92. See STEPHEN BAKER, FINAL JEOPARDY: MAN VS. MACHINE AND THE QUEST TO KNOW
EVERYTHING 148–69 (2011) (discussing the various limitations of artificial intelligence).
93. See, e.g., High-Level Expert Grp. on Artificial Intelligence, Ethics Guidelines for
Trustworthy AI (Apr. 8, 2019) (EU), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm
?doc_id=60419 [https://perma.cc/Q3B7-AE6E] (discussing principles for developing better
artificial intelligence systems).
94. See Arner et al., supra note 4, at 102–04; Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating
by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147,
1152–54 (2017) (discussing the use of machine-learning algorithms in government regulatory
actions).
95. See, e.g., BENJAMIN ALARIE ET AL., REGULATION BY MACHINE 1–2 (2016);
DAUGHERTY & WILSON, supra note 2, at 138–43; MALONE, supra note 2, at 50–56; Kevin
Roose, A Machine May Not Take Your Job, but One Could Become Your Boss, N.Y. TIMES
(June 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/23/technology/artificial-intelligence-aiworkplace.html [https://perma.cc/KT2L-NGHC].
96. See FELIX MARTIN, MONEY: THE UNAUTHORISED BIOGRAPHY 27–29 (2014) (alluding
to money as a social technology); KABIR SEHGAL, COINED: THE RICH LIFE OF MONEY AND
HOW ITS HISTORY HAS SHAPED US 2–3 (2015) (discussing the social role of money).
97. PASQUALE, supra note 69, at 102–04.
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heart of finance and markets.98 People create supply and demand. People
move markets. It is flesh and blood people who need finance and financing
for education, homes, health care, investments, and other life and social
pursuits.99 Finance is ultimately a tool of social utility and connection that
would lose much of its meaning without the context of people and society.100
One of the critical responsibilities for executives, policymakers, and
regulators in the years ahead centers on how better to update a twentiethcentury financial system to account for twenty-first-century financial
advances like artificial intelligence without losing focus on the humanoriented missions of finance and democratic values like equal access and
transparency.101 Doing so will not be easy given the serious challenges of
modern politics, old narratives, and scarce resources.102 Furthermore, the
objectives of regulating new financial technology can often be crosscutting,
whereby achieving one objective like greater transparency could undercut
other objectives like efficiency and fairness.103 That said, properly
recognizing the human heart of finance is key to better understanding and
harnessing the power of financial artificial intelligence for positive monetary
and social impact, while taming its hostilities.104 To legislate, regulate,
innovate, and act on finance divorced from its human participants,
beneficiaries, and victims—while theoretically elegant—can lead to serious
negative consequences.105 In fact, as noted earlier, in the run up to the
financial crisis of 2008, too many regulators and firms placed too much faith
in the elegant models of smart machines and lost focus on the real-world
implications of finance and markets to the detriment of society.106
In sum, as finance grows more reliant on new technologies like artificial
intelligence, key financial stakeholders must grow more vigilant in
safeguarding the people-centered, social purposes of finance.107
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RISK AND RETURN 1 (2017).
99. See id. (“We see finance everywhere, from our retirement assets to our investments in
housing and education.”).
100. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 174–75 (2006); SCHILLER, supra note 10, at 8–9.
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CONCLUSION
The rise and growth of artificial intelligence in finance and beyond will
likely be one of the most significant developments for law, finance, and
society in the coming years and decades. The early movements offer
glimpses of the awesome powers and potential of financial artificial
intelligence. Nevertheless, as financial artificial intelligence continues to
grow and evolve, we must also become more aware of its potential risks and
limitations. We must grow more cognizant of the ways financial artificial
intelligence can harm and hinder individual as well as societal progress.
This Article broadly highlights some of the critical risks and limitations of
financial artificial intelligence while being largely appreciative of its
incredible potential applications. Specifically, it sheds light on the perils and
pitfalls of artificial codes, data bias, virtual threats, and systemic risks
relating to financial artificial intelligence. It also raises broader issues about
the implications of financial artificial intelligence on financial cybersecurity,
competition, and society in the near future. This Article aims to offer an
insightful perspective for thinking anew about the wide-ranging effects at the
intersection of artificial intelligence, finance, and the law with the hope of
creating better financial artificial intelligence. In the end, one of the most
daunting and consequential endeavors for executives, policymakers,
scholars, and other stakeholders working in law and finance going forward is
to create better financial artificial intelligence—one that is less artificial,
more intelligent, and ultimately more humane, and more human.

